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Value and Utility in a Historical Perspective  
 
Peter Pogany 
 
Abstract 
 
Since value and utility are the highest profile abstractions that underlie an epoch‘s 
intellectual climate and ethical principles, their evolution reflects the transformation 
of socioeconomic conditions and institutions. The ―Classical Phase‖ flourished 
during the first global system, laissez-faire/metal money/zero multilateralism 
(GS1); the second, ―Subjective/Utilitarian‖ phase marked the long transition to the 
current epoch of ―Modern Subjectivism/General Equilibrium,‖ tied to the second 
and extant global system, mixed economy/minimum reserve banking/weak 
multilateralism (GS2). History has witnessed the material de-essentialization of 
value and substantialization of utility. But now the two concepts face a thorough 
transvaluation as the world‘s combined demographic and economic expansion 
encounters ecological/physical limitations. An extended macrohistoric implosion 
may lead to a third form of global self-organization: two-level economy/maximum 
bank reserve money/strong multilateralism (GS3). If history unfolds along the 
suggested path, not only economics, but also thinking about economics would 
change. It would be considered an evolving hermeneutic of the human condition 
expressed through global-system-specific texts. The implied critical alteration, with 
the recognition of the entropy law‘s importance as its focal point, matches the 
prediction of Swiss thinker Jean Gebser (1905-1973) about the impending mutation 
of human consciousness into its integral/arational structure. Such extrapolations 
form the context in which the fourth historical phase of value and utility is 
hypothesized, leading to the material re-essentialization of value and de-
substantialization of utility.   
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1. Introduction/Summary 
 
If, after the pattern of ―holier-than-thou,‖ there were a competitive relationship among 
general, abstract concepts that vie for being the ultimate basis of economic inquiry, utility 
and value could claim that ―we are more ontological-than-thou.‖ Between the two, utility 
is more basic than value.
1
 
 
Utility is the quality in things, events, and circumstances (beyond the problematic of its 
quantification) that can impart satisfaction and felicity. Although this quality is 
biologically and socially determined, one may say that at any given moment, the potency 
for such experiences is rooted in the individual. In contrast, value is a complex condition 
that represents a compromise between internally registered needs and wants and the 
economy‘s actual ability to satisfy them. As is well known, abundance can reduce the 
value of a good to near free status even if it is indispensable for existence, viz., it may be 
characterized as a carrier of infinite utility.      
 
This paper identifies three major phases in the evolution of thinking about value and 
utility and relates them to ―new historical materialism‖ (NHM).2 
 
NHM considers human evolution a thermodynamic phenomenon in which the combined 
substance of the human biomass and objects created through the economic process 
represents the central variable, called GLOPPE -- global population plus economy.    
GLOPPE is a dissipative material entity, which, as a result of its growth over the eons, 
demanded global-scale self-organization towards the end of the 18
th
 century.  
 
As has been observed in many natural phenomena and demonstrated in physics and 
mathematics, dissipative material entities undergo alternating phases of relative 
(dynamic) steady states and chaotic transitions as they expand.
3
 The parameters or 
control variables of a given level of self-organization allow their growth only to a certain 
point. When they get in the way, the system breaks down (―bifurcates‖) and the search 
for a new set of growth-accommodating parameters/control variables begins. Transition 
from one form of self-organization to another is chaotic per force since conflicting 
alternatives compete to become the new system‘s ―blueprint.‖  
 
World history reflects this pattern. The first form of GLOPPE‘s self-organization, laissez-
faire/metal money/zero multilateralism (GS1), broke down in 1914 and a chaotic 
transition led to its second (and current) form, mixed economy/minimum reserve 
banking/weak multilateralism (GS2). The world is now facing a crisis because GLOPPE  
behaves as if the terrestrial sphere, which it dissipates as it grows, were an open 
thermodynamic system when, in reality, it is a closed system.  
                                                 
1
 In the modern era, value preceded utility in theoretical development. Therefore, when the two concepts 
are mentioned together in a historical context (as in the title), it is ―value and utility,‖ but when reference to 
them subsumes a descending scale of abstraction, it is ―utility and value.‖ 
2
 For details, see Pogany (2006). 
3
 See, Kondepundi and Prigogine (1998), Yates (1987), and ―dissipative structures‖ under ―Index‖ in 
Prigogine (1997).   
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If humanity passes its first collective test of cosmic intelligence, the impending chaotic 
transition ought to lead to a form of self-organization that takes this physical fact into 
consideration. Emergence of a new global system, two-level economy/maximum bank 
reserve money/strong multilateralism (GS3) is highly probable. It would be equivalent to  
GLOPPE‘s acquisition of an effective central nervous system.  
 
Each global system has its text, the summary of its basic operating principles with a 
quasi-theological status during the system‘s lifetime. As the system approaches its end, 
the text becomes obsolete. Exhaustion of its epistemic capacity renders it less and less 
adequate to explain actual conditions and to recommend solutions for current problems.
4
     
 
The comprehensive transformation of individual behavior and socioeconomic conditions 
implied by GS3 jibes with the impending mutation of consciousness into its integral-
arational form as foreseen by Jean Gebser (1905-1973)
 5
 Leaning on Gebserian insights, 
this paper argues that the emerging new, basic comprehension of the species‘ condition 
will integrate natural and other social sciences, as well as the humanities into economics, 
and that thinking about value and utility will see its fourth historic phase.  
 
First, let us remove the ―useless‖ sticker from the two concepts. 
  
Perhaps no other author has expressed a more profound skepticism about them than one 
of the 20
th
 century‘s most influential economic philosopher, Joan Robinson (1903-1983). 
Value, she said ―has no operational content. It is just a word‖ (Robinson, 1962, p. 47).  In 
the third chapter of Economic Philosophy (Robinson, 1962, pp. 48-74), she characterized 
utility as a metaphysical term of impregnable circularity. Utility is the attribute of a 
commodity that generates its value and we value commodities because ―they have 
utility.‖   
 
Robinson‘s uniquely caustic, refreshing analysis, which often left paradoxes hanging in 
the air, never allowing thinking to come to a full stop, leads exactly to the comprehensive 
perspective embraced in this paper. As she pointed out, while they may have no practical 
significance (e.g., in investment decisions, or in making or justifying policies), value and 
utility do carry moral significance, and, consequently, they express ethical principles. 
Indeed, could they do this without being metaphysical?  
 
                                                 
4
 The obsolescence of GS2‘s text is perfectly demonstrated by the political stalemate over budget deficits in 
some of the most advanced economies. These deficits have reached the level where the credibility of 
sovereign debt is questioned (i.e., they should not be increased). At the same time, the text is clear on the 
dangers of increasing taxes and/or reducing spending when economic performance is sluggish. The much 
lampooned deadlock in U.S. governance over the federal deficit seems to be the only logical answer to this 
problem, unsolvable as it is through rational maneuvering within GS2‘s policy space.  
5
 A brief descriptions of Gebser may be found in Combs (1996) and Feuerstein (1987); for a thumbnail 
sketch see http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27221/1/MPRA_paper_27221.pdf. The reader is invited to 
consult the ultimate sources: Gebser (1975) and Gebser (1984) -- The Ever-Present Origin -- in the brilliant 
translation of Noel Barstad and Algis Mickunas.   
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Each global system has its inseparable, inalienably characteristic moral platform. The two 
have a common fate since none could exist without the other. GS2‘s ethical principles 
(i.e., the norms that guide moral behavior and intentionality) are very different from those 
that had prevailed when GS1 represented the world order. From this perspective, it is 
hardly surprising that value and utility are subject to transformation over historical time. 
 
The shift of emphasis from value to utility during GS1 signaled the emergence of the 
consumer as the central focus of the economic process. Theory became socially more 
comprehensive. Whereas the classical doctrine did not consider wages part of the national 
income, utilitarian thought during the second half of the 19
th
 century did. Labor became 
recognized as a sacrifice (i.e., real wages compensate for the disutility of work), paving 
the way for GS2‘s mass production/mass consumption, unimaginable without collective 
bargaining. GS2‘s real prices, opportunity costs, and marginal utility ratios tending 
towards equality with the whole (―well-behaved‖) algebra of consumer behavior are 
indispensable for the current text‘s assertions about the market economy‘s inherent 
tendency toward general equilibrium. 
 
The structure of understanding reality does not currently enjoy ontological definitiveness, 
transparency. But this does not change the fact that such structure exists. Commonplace 
theories and conceptualizations are built on more fundamental ideas that underlie the 
theologization, theorization, empirification, and vulgarization of thinking under a 
prevalent global system. Therefore, as metaphysical manifestations of the system‘s 
ethical deep pulse, value and utility have certainly (use) value and utility. Their ethical 
pith, in profound immediacy with the system‘s ideology, is mediated through concrete 
concepts and theories.  
 
Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem comes to mind. Applying it to GS2, the system of 
neoclassical fundamentals constitutes a coherent, closed algebra of the loftiest rigor (as 
general equilibrium models demonstrate it) but it needs to import universal structuring 
principles in the form of ethically-charged concepts (such value and utility) in order to be 
complete. Only so can economics appear not as a compendium of ideas about reality but 
reality itself, and only so can ideological and institutional stability reify socioeconomic 
conditions, making them appear as part of the natural environment. And it is exactly this 
ahistorical rationality that this paper intends to disprove. When it comes to the history of 
global self-organization, the second law of thermodynamics is vested with a greater direct 
relevance than the conservation law, or symbolically; Heraclites trumps Parmenides.        
Concern about the unfolding global crisis motivates dealing with value and utility 
historically.  
 
The nature and seriousness of this crisis was well expressed by Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1900-2002), a philosopher of foundational significance in 20
th
 century hermeneutics. In 
1986, he said: 
 
―In our contemporary situation, faced as we are with an increasingly widespread anxiety about 
the future of mankind, the issue is the suspicion slowly seeping into the consciousness of all that, 
if we go on this way, if we pursue industrialization, think of work only in terms of profit, and turn 
our earth into one vast factory as we are doing at the moment, then we threaten the conditions of 
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human life in both the biological sense and in the sense of our own ideals for being human, even 
to the extreme of self-destruction.‖ (Gadamer 2003, 542)6 
 
GLOPPE‘s encounter with its limits is revealed through emerging resource shortages, 
environmental degradation, and the dysfunction of GS2‘s ―accelerate or collapse‖ 
economic organization, financial-monetary order. ―Peak Oil‖ is nature‘s first eloquent 
―cool it‖ message to humanity‘s untutored belief that there can be infinite growth in a 
closed thermodynamic system.
7
 It is manifest in a so far largely unrecognized back-and-
forth between growth and oil prices. Growth raises oil prices, which then disables growth. 
The disabled growth pushes down oil prices, rekindling growth.  
 
The impasse is complete and persistent. The level of oil prices that would facilitate 
effective substitution is too high to maintain the robust aggregate economic performance 
that would be needed to encourage significant amounts of private investment in 
alternative energy sources.  
 
The omnipresence of oil in the economy makes the entire substitution process dependent 
on oil prices. Moreover, divergent corporate interests in the oil industry and the special 
perspectives of oil exporter countries have created an opaque dynamism that is beyond 
the reach of rational maneuvering through national or multilateral policies.
8
  
 
After a transitional age of unknown length and intensity, a new world order (e.g., GS3) is 
expected to be the response to the adaptive pressure now beginning to be exerted on 
homo sapiens. This proposition ought not to be regarded either as moral advocacy or as a 
conviction of historical necessity. It represents an optimistic outcome. Nonetheless, any 
lasting equilibrium between GLOPPE and the terrestrial sphere‘s ability to support the 
human enterprise seems unimaginable without integral-arational individual consciousness 
on a mass scale. And it is exactly this mutation that would bring about the material re-
essentialization of value and de-substantialization of utility.            
    
                                                 
6
 The knee-jerk reaction of orthodox economics to the complaint that potential over-industrialization will 
ruin the planet is that ―demographic transition,‖ accompanied by ―economic transition‖ toward services and 
a nonresource-intensive knowledge economy will save the world. These arguments are patently artless.  
Generalizing developed country living standards (enjoyed by one-fifth of the world population) even for 
the current ca. seven billion people is impossible without provoking severe resource shortages and ruining 
the environment beyond repair. Making the same calculations with ten billions (the projected level of 
global population by the end of the century) yields a tragic incongruity. Reaching the enormous fixed cost 
that comes with successful industrialization presupposes major increases in the throughput of material 
resources. Real estate services, web page design, marriage counseling, and consultancy on interior 
decoration are no substitutes for metals, minerals, timber, and energy carriers needed to create developed-
country-living conditions for billions of slum dwellers.            
7
 For a clear account of the world‘s oil predicament, see Deffeyes (2010).  
8
 When it comes to oil, traditional thinking about orderly depletion along the lines of the Hotelling Rule no 
longer applies. The marginal user cost, a crucial component of the price (in addition to the marginal cost of 
extraction), is dependent on the discount rate, which is linked to the market rate of interest in practical 
calculations. However, given oil‘s preeminent role in overall economic performance, its price indirectly 
and significantly influences interest rates. A closely related, nonnegligible phenomenon is that claims on oil 
as a physical commodity have acquired the characteristics of financial assets. See,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499099   
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2. Historical De-essentialization of Value and Substantialization of Utility     
 
Do goods have intrinsic, absolute, natural values that differ from their exchange values 
and exist independently from the satisfaction (i.e., the utility) their consumption 
provides? If yes, can its cause be pinned down, can its magnitude be measured, and if not 
would arguments about it match the merit of deciding how many angels can frolic on the 
tip of a needle?  From Plato (5
th
 century BCE) and Aristotle (4
th
 century BCE) to the 
present, economic thought has tried to come to terms with this problem. But every time 
someone cried ―Eureka, I got it; period, end of story,‖ some new development upset what 
may (at least in retrospect) be regarded as a shaky consensus.   
 
During the past two and a half centuries, efforts to interpret value as an objective 
numerically expressible absolute that exists as an essence independent of consciousness 
petered out. This is what is meant by the word de-essentialization.     
 
The implied historical transformation may be broken down into three major phases: 
classical theories (committed to one form or another of an objective/absolute magnitude); 
subjective theories (built around the utilitarian view of consumption), and the 
contemporary (―modern‖) subjective approach, which through ―gestalt mathematics,9‖ 
using only some of the logical features and patterns (―consistency postulates‖) of early 
subjective/utilitarian tenets, has seemingly eliminated the need for any further theorizing 
about value. 
  
It is important to underscore that characteristic thinking about value during each of the 
three phases also represents characteristic thinking about utility. In the end, the positivist 
trend that has come to dominate social sciences since the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
has eliminated the difficulty of grasping the subjective, qualitative sensation attached to 
satisfaction derived from goods. 
 
Utility in contemporary models has been equated with the level of consumption (―p x q‖). 
This is what ―substantiation of utility‖ means.     
 
After briefly reviewing the three phases, it will be shown that the current satisfaction 
among mainstream economists that the problems of value and utility have been solved 
                                                 
9
 ―Gestalt mathematics‖ was invented by Hermann Friedmann during World War II (Gebser, 1984, p. 389, 
n. 25). It deploys features of the whole to identify characteristics of the parts that are neither readily 
deducible by inspection nor obtainable by summation. ―Gestalt‖ in the word‘s broadest sense, appropriately 
describes the competitive free market system. It refers to a social organization with basic features and 
potentialities that cannot be deduced from the simple inspection and/or summation of the parts. That is, an 
invisible transmission mechanism turns myopic strivings (individual biological energy) into the satisfaction 
of social needs; permitting the process to preserve its relative steadiness without the requirement that the 
parts be in equilibrium. Perhaps Gerard Debreu expressed the gestalt nature of contemporary general 
equilibrium mathematics most succinctly when he summed up the change in mathematical economics from 
traditional differential calculus to making use of the envisaged model‘s ―convexity and topological 
properties‖ (Debreu, 1959, p. x).  
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once and for all is based on a puerile, anthropocentric reduction of humanity‘s 
thermodynamic reality.    
 
2.1. The Classical Phase 
 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) telescoped and expanded the work of several major thinkers 
before him to formulate his labor theory of value (LTV); expand it to a rudimentary ―cost 
of production‖ approach, casting light on the importance of relative values. David 
Ricardo (1772-1823) made definitive changes on all these accounts. He pointed out the 
significance of the relative amounts of labor in determining exchange rates among 
commodities (i.e., their real prices); elaborated the ―cost of production‖ approach, and 
applied the principle of diminishing returns -- attributed to Robert Malthus (1776-1834) -
- to value determination.      
 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) developed his own cost-of-production theory of value 
(wages accounting for the disutility of labor plus profits stemming from the abstinence of 
capitalists) and further underscored the significance of relative values, the importance of 
supply and demand relations.
10
 He sighed with great satisfaction in 1848: ―Happily, there 
is nothing in the laws of value which remains for the present or any future writer to clear 
up; the theory of the subject is complete‖ (Marshall, 1967, p.119).  
 
In his magnum opus, the first volume of Das Kapital (1867), Karl Marx (1818-1883) 
forcefully criticized all previous formulations of LTV as erroneous, insufficient, or 
apologetic of capitalist exploitation. The special features of Marxian LTV are (a) shifting  
emphasis from the role of the margin (as in Ricardo‘s theory) to the average, to the so-
called ―socially necessary abstract labor time;‖ (b) reducing value-determining factors to 
labor;
11
 and (c) categorically divorcing the forces that shape absolute (or immanent) value 
from those that determine prices.  
 
One may say that by concentrating on the cost (supply) side of the market, the classics 
(including Mill) searched for the same thing as the Greek philosophers and medieval 
scholastics;
12
that is, for some essence in commodity values, which, by being ―natural‖ 
and objective, is independent from the infinite variety of contingent circumstances; the 
vagaries of individual judgment.   
 
Utility and value remained understandably disjointed concepts during the first phase. 
While value was regarded quantitatively proportional to the exertion of human effort in 
the process of production, the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
considered utility a complicated psychological phenomenon that emerges in the process 
of consumption. Value could be measured at least in principle, but dwelling in the 
                                                 
10
 See, Schumpeter (1954), pp. 189, 530, 589, 603, 604. Mill, who had a great deal to say about utility, 
almost completely ignored it as a determinant of value (Marshall, 1967, p. 119).  
11
 Marx was particularly contemptuous of the ―abstinence theory‖ of profit (Marx, 1906, pp. 648-656).   
12
 Saint Thomas of Aquinas (1225-1274) elaborated on the concept of ―just price,‖ already known to 
ancient Greeks.  
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Platonic realm of inaccessible ideas, utility could be recognized only through 
introspection and self-observation.  
 
In contrast, the second phase thrived on connecting value and utility.  
 
2.2. The Subjective/Utilitarian Phase 
  
A breakthrough in the search for the meaning of value occurred toward the end of the 19
th
 
century when analysis began to focus on utility as a quantitative phenomenon. The 
concept of marginal utility was born.
13
 The understanding of value based on it revolves 
around the satisfaction derived from consuming the last unit of a commodity. The 
approach was ostensibly demand-oriented but, contrary to the often heard opinion, it did 
not ignore production costs. (See, Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 921-924). Marginal 
utilitarianism did recognize the ―supply side‖ but considered it subordinate to demand, a 
view that, in many respects, is quite close to the prevalent conviction that the material 
desires of sovereign consumers indirectly guide the allocation of resources with profound 
implications for the costs of production in a free-market, competitive economy.  
 
If a single word had to be chosen to characterize the operating principle behind the 
marginal utilitarian view, it ought to be scarcity. When a good is scarce, its marginal 
utility is high, but as it becomes increasingly abundant, its marginal utility declines. That 
is, value is determined on the margin.  
 
Thoughts about general equilibrium (GE) logically followed from this view, with further 
consequences regarding ―value.‖ Early elaborators of GE, Leon Walras (1834-1910), and 
(to a lesser extent) Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), had reconnected value with price but in 
very tentative ways. Although Walras claimed that interrelated markets would engage in 
tâtonnement toward equilibrium prices, which, by imputation, would reflect the 
immanent values of commodities; and Marshall considered equilibrium across markets 
approximating ―normal prices‖ (production costs) theoretically acceptable, both men 
were keenly aware that the chances of such ideal conditions becoming reality were 
practically zero.  
 
Nonetheless, in the eyes of present-day neoclassical writers, both the marginal utility 
school (which included the first wave of ―Austrians‖) and the early predecessors of 
modern GE analysis (with Walras as an obvious overlap by virtue of occurring on both 
lists) share the credit for no longer thinking about value as an absolute but rather as a 
relative measure. According to this relativistic perspective, which received detailed 
elaboration and strong emphasis in Marshall‘s work, value can have no meaning except 
in reference to a given quantity of another good, i.e., to its opportunity cost. Thus, by all 
appearances, the problem of finding an absolute, intrinsic measure of value had been 
                                                 
13
 This breakthrough was credited to the contributions of Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), William 
Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), Carl Menger (1840-1921), Friedrich Wieser (1851-1926), Eugen Böhm von 
Bawerk (1851-1914), John Bates Clark (1847-1938), Léon Walras (1834-1910), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-
1923), and Knut Wicksell (1851-1926). Cf. Marshall (1967), Chapter IX.  
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eliminated through the emphasis of subjectivity (a touchstone of ―Austrian‖ value theory) 
and measurement through other commodities rather than through the costs of production.  
 
Value became a strictly subjective phenomenon that has meaning only in a relative sense; 
i.e., as the opportunity cost of consuming a good or employing a productive input, and 
only in the context of aggregate consumption and production. Although the concept had 
remained of central importance during the second phase, the locus of its determination 
gradually shifted to the entire system of interrelated markets. In the end, values became 
mutually determining moving targets; never self-standing and expressible only through 
the elusive (money-price-based) valuation of other commodities. This tendency 
culminated during the third phase.   
 
2.3. The Phase of Modern Subjectivism in the Framework of General Equilibrium   
 
John Richard Hicks (1904-1989), a scholar and a gentleman in an older tradition, often 
mingled praise with criticism. In his period-defining Value and Capital (Hicks, 1946), he 
attributed more error and sterility to Walras, whose program he pledged to continue, than 
to Marshall – whom he profoundly admired -- while breaking the ground under his 
edifice. Hicks considered quantitative utility, hence marginal utility (crucial during the 
Victorian period of the previous phase but still present in Marshall‘s conceptualization of 
GE) arbitrary, dubious, and irrelevant (Hicks, 1946, pp. 17, 18, 19, and 24). Indifference 
maps -- the brainchild of Francis Ysidore Edgeworth (1845-1926) with major 
elaborations by Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Irving Fisher (1867-1947) -- as a source 
of information to analyze consumer preferences in developing a value theory did not fare 
much better.
14
 But all these preliminaries were necessary for Hicks to move thinking 
about value to the next level.       
 
By seeing through the possibilities of ―gestalt mathematics,‖ Hicks formulated a set of 
equations (testable for consistency and optimizability) in which unknowns could be 
calculated by relying on readily acceptable correspondences among unknowable 
variables and parameters. We may not be able to calculate marginal utilities but we can 
say something crucial about their relationship to prices in equilibrium. We may not know 
a single indifference curve (hyper-surface) but can reasonably characterize the slope of 
each curve and the movement along it over time. Then analog conceptualizations on the 
supply side for the representative firm (with institutional assumptions about the 
―generalized law of demand‖ and interest rates of a definitively Keynesian flavor) will 
result in a robustly consistent, static GE.  
 
Prices (ratios) approach their equilibrium levels and this process may be expected to 
resume after a slight disturbance as long as parameters (defined by the optimization 
scheme‘s internal algebra) remain within their specified range.   
 
                                                 
14
 Pareto used such an approach, and although it was discarded, his work included the formulation of 
optimality conditions (―economic efficiency‖) in a perfectly competitive economy, which (as may be seen 
by consulting any intermediary microeconomics textbook) is still crucial to mainstream economic thinking. 
 10 
Thus, ―natural value‖ of a commodity as a partial phenomenon, already substantially 
weakened by the marginal school, became explicitly subject to the influence of all 
interacting parts in Hick‘s comprehensive multimarket algebra. Values, resulting from 
averaging out aggregated subjective preferences, expressed in terms of some arbitrary 
numeraire, have moved to the inaccessible realm of pure ideas. We see only their 
rudimentary, imperfect reflections on the cave wall, as in Plato‘s famous parable.         
 
The last two pages in the second edition (1946) of Value and Capital contain a kind of 
afterthought to afterthoughts. It bears the title ―Professor Samuelson‘s Dynamic Theory.‖ 
With unfailing insight into the foundational significance of Keynesian analysis and the 
potential of Paul Samuelson to turn it into a comprehensive system of fundamentals, 
Hicks may be regarded as the first neo-Keynesian (or neoclassical) synthesizer.       
 
The work of Paul Anthony Samuelson (1915 – 2009) was a critical milestone in the 
development of the third, contemporary phase of de-essentializing value. His 
―Foundations of Economic Analysis‖ (Samuelson, 1948) laid the theoretical groundwork 
for turning ―neoclassical synthesis‖ into GS2 economics. His introductory textbook with 
its cryptic, end-all title, ―Economics,‖ was first published in the same year. Several 
editions of ―Economics‖ have seen the daylight since then and it served as the boiler plate 
for competing efforts on the undergraduate textbook market. It became the prevalent 
global system‘s text. More will be said about the social role of the text below. Suffice it to 
say here that one would not be mistaken by comparing it to a catechism, the corpus of 
information required for the practice of faith. It embodies the minimum standard 
knowledge that policymakers must either possess or must have immediate access to 
through appropriately trained staff members.     
 
The de-essentialization of value, which moved into high gear with Hicks, intensified with 
Samuelson: ―. . . many writers have ceased to believe in the existence of any introspective 
magnitude or quantity of a cardinal, numerical kind. With this skepticism has come the 
recognition that a cardinal measure of utility is, in any case, unnecessary: that only an 
ordinal preference, involving ―more‖ or ―less‖ but not ―how much,‖ is required for the 
analysis of consumer‘s behavior‖ (Samuelson, 1948, p. 91).  
 
This does not mean the complete discarding of the utility (subjective value) school 
(dubbed ―modern‖ to distinguish it from the classics in the first phase). The ultimate push 
to de-essentializing through gestalt-mathematics is built on it. Samuelson: ―. . . modern 
utility theory with all its qualifications is not in a technical sense meaningless. It is a 
hypothesis which places definite restrictions upon demand functions and price-quantity 
data‖ (op. cit., p. 92).  
 
The de-essentialization of value became complete through the ―axiomatic analysis of 
economic equilibrium‖ (Debreu, 1959). In this penultimate step to building computable 
general equilibrium models for policy analysis, ―value‖ no longer lingers even as a 
shadow: ―The fact that the price of a commodity is positive, null, or negative is not an 
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intrinsic property of that commodity; it depends on the technology, the tastes, the 
resources  . . .‖ (Debreu, 1959, p. 33.)15  
 
Parallel with the disappearance of value in the swirling quagmire of ―general 
equilibrium‖ topology; thinking about utility -- an elusive metaphysical-psychological 
concept since its inception -- had bifurcated. While one branch became etherized by 
moving in the direction of the Neumann-Morgenstern utility expectation model (a virtual 
savant, game-theoretical construct that has resisted valiant efforts to be put to any 
significant practical use), the other gained corporeity by becoming a continuous function 
that (―rational‖) consumers want to maximize.  
 
Economists linked the concept of utility to demand theory, thus to consumer behavior; 
struggling, of course, with the problem of social utility.
16
 The comprehensive work of 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), which has served as a basic reference for so much 
research in the field, attests to this transformation. The heavily algebraic and econometric 
treatment of the utility-consumer/utility-social welfare link masked this reduction. 
Preoccupation with testing and qualifying the additive and homothetic nature of ―utility 
functions‖ (containing nothing but commodities and a budget constraint) made related 
research appear deep, rich, sophisticated, and even revolutionary by virtue of 
contradicting established conventions.
17
 
 
Modern subjectivism does not attribute economic value to leisure time. Thus, income has 
only one component: real income.
18
 But, of course, the subject did not disappear from 
economic analysis. Leisure and income jointly appear in standard microeconomic algebra 
and introductory texts show the wage rate as the equilibrating factor between marginal 
preferences.
19
        
 
In general, mathematical modeling in economics is both intellectually satisfying and 
prestigious. The unrecognized downside is the elimination of the space between 
comprehension and acceptance. Widespread absorption of meaningfully deployed 
                                                 
15
 The development of computable (or applied) general equilibrium models was the result of a stupendous 
intellectual effort. Any attempt to list even only the principal contributors to this crowning success story of 
neoclassical economics is condemned to be lacking. Nonetheless, all such lists must include the names of 
Kenneth Arrow and Lionel McKenzie (1919-2010) along with Gerard Debreu. John von Neumann (1903-
1957) and Shizuo Kakutani (1911- 2004) provided the crucial ingredient of a fixed point theorem. A list of 
those whose work assured topological consistency and  a meaningful solvability of the pertinent equation 
system may be seen at Samuelson (1948, p. 170, n. 33).  
16
 Distributive fairness in the face of a systemically-ideologically encouraged materialistic aggrandizement 
bothered economists. Many remarkable works saw the daylight during the past decades but mostly in the 
framework of neoclassical fundamentals. Cf. Feldman and Kirman (1974). 
17
 Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau  (1975) is a telling example. 
18
 Indeed, our era tends to devalue free time. During the past 100 years, despite the huge overall increase in 
welfare, average per capita leisure has increased only 4-5 hours per week in the United States; cf. Ramey 
and Francis (2009).  
19
 By showing that moods and emotions have an impact on time preference, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) 
successfully disproves this simplification. But in light of this finding one wonders to what extent the 
indicated minor gain in leisure is the result of free choice, i.e., devoid of compulsive socioeconomic 
conditions and/or psychological conditioning that push the individual to prefer real income to leisure 
income.   
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mathematical methodology makes a theory or a proposition to be regarded as 
―knowledge,‖ especially if it comes from a first water academic source.20   
 
When all this is transcribed into applied general equilibrium calculations -- with 
apologies along the line that ―there is nothing better out there for the moment‖ -- 
consumption approximates utility; and consequently, the maximization of global output 
(without the slightest thought about its scale limit) struts the stage in the role of an 
uncontested universal telos.
21
    
 
To sum up, the conceptual ―de-essentialization‖ of value has been accompanied by a 
crass materialistic ―substantiation‖ of utility, from an imaginary quantity, determined by 
many different factors, including the enjoyment of leisure, to ―hedonometry‖ 
(Edgeworth), viz., consumption, plain and simple. Although the two tendencies are each 
other‘s exact opposites, their result is identical: value and utility have been removed from 
the agenda of economic theorizing. To see why this conclusion represents a false ending, 
we need to make an unparsimonious detour. 
  
3. Utopian Extrapolations of Conservative Economics; Homo Faber Getting Hoisted 
by his Own Thermodynamic Petard.  
 
Neoclassical economic writings do not let the bad taste caused by a cursory reference to 
the finiteness of natural resources and the severity of environmental problems linger. 
Soon the tendency toward eternal equilibrium brightens the sky and the colorful rainbow 
of forever-accelerating economic growth reappears on a flexibly receding horizon.  
 
By expanding the concept of capital to include what is in the human brain, the 
knowledge-cum-service economy (running on sunshine and man‘s innovative genius) had 
been discovered, turning economic growth into an ultra-phenomenon whose end lies 
beyond articulated space and time.  
           
Samuelson‘s comparison of dynamic equilibrium in a free-market economy to the 
workings of the ―Le Châtelier Principle22‖ (known from thermodynamics and chemistry) 
reveals perhaps most eloquently the foreknowledge-like sophism underlying ―GS2 
ideology,‖ as it is reflected in its simplified transcript, the text. 
 
By considering the economic process under laissez faire analogue to a chemical 
phenomenon discovered by French metallurgist and chemist Henry Le Châtelier (1850-
1936), not less is achieved than imputing the timeless solidity of the physical order to 
                                                 
20
 Baumol (1985) gives a highly instructive, broad-horizon account on how economics changed from (what 
the present paper defined as) the second to the third phase. 
21
 Even the concept of communal total utility, hence the possibility of democratically pursued collective 
rationality via social welfare policies, came under attack by Kenneth Arrow‘s ethical-relativism promoting 
―impossibility theorem‖ (Arrow, 1950). It speaks to the effectiveness and prestige of this wildly 
individualistic worldview -- with a definitive existentialist flavor of the mid-20
th
 century -- that decades 
later, economists still argue against its implications. See, for example, Sen (1999).  
22
 Samuelson (1948), pp. 21, 36, 38 n, 81, 168. 
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human institutions, social goals and individual behavior. Just as according to the Le 
Châtelier Principle, a displacement of chemical equilibrium provokes forces that will 
oppose, minimize, and neutralize the change, the free market economy restores 
equilibrium after it is shocked (for instance by technical innovations); hence it ought to 
be considered naturally as robust as the Rock of Gibraltar.    
 
The motivation of profit-seekers to increase production to satisfy the never-ending desire 
of consumers to increase consumption has been welded to axiomatic set- and function-
theoretical assumptions that will guarantee economic equilibrium as would any other 
(simpler or more complicated) unfalsifiable circularity.  
 
Thermodynamic innocence is nested deep in the penetralia of mainstream economics. It 
derives from the implicit assumption that, except for solar radiation (and re-radiation), 
our world as a process is isothermal (adiabatic) along a geological timescale. Since heat 
and work can be equated, the isothermal worldview implies that no ability to do work is 
lost as a result of demographic and economic expansion within the terrestrial sphere.  
 
The consequences of man‘s vampire appetite for low entropy in the context of the second 
law‘s relevance to ingesting and extruding our ecological niche‘s limited supply of free 
(accessible) energy contained in structured matter (―congealed energy‖) has been left out 
of the ―felicific calculus‖ (Jeremy Bentham) of Nobel-prize-caliber economic wisdom. 
Satisfaction derived from consumption (―ophelimity,‖ to use Pareto‘s term) dominates 
economic consciousness.         
 
The text‘s existential basis includes the unshakeable conviction that natural resources are 
infinite and that their significance tends to diminish with science-and-technology-driven 
economic development.  
 
Although this fundamentally Newtonian worldview, masquerading as a 
thermodynamically supported, unassailable truth (linked to the pretension that only the 
first -- or conservation -- law is relevant to economic development) still rules the minds, 
it no longer does so without facing effective challenges. Awareness that what nature 
offers is not gratis; that human existence entails irrevocable qualitative changes in the 
environment has begun to penetrate collective consciousness.  
 
The work of Georgescu-Roegen (1971) has proved to be a critical milestone in the long 
and painful struggle of extending the phenomenal domain of economic activities with its 
entropic consequences. Its virtually paradigmatic banishment, peppered with derisive 
recognition and sarcastic criticism on occasion, has showed that GS2 economics, with its 
characteristic narrow empiricism and sectored rationality, is too parochial to recognize 
the thermodynamic absurdity of prevalent economic aspirations. Further progress toward 
transparency must entail the temporal analysis of the most inclusive macroscopic 
variable.    
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4. New Historical Materialism, the Ultimate Integrum -- GLOPPE 
 
Dispensing entirely with anthropocentric narcissism, the human biomass and everything 
produced and manufactured by humans, plus all forms of life (plants and animals) in 
human service may be pictured as a restless, expanding clump of matter. Let us call this 
physical entity GLOPPE – global population plus economy. 
 
GLOPPE is a ―far-from-equilibrium, dissipative structure‖ with emergent properties. 
Such structures go through alternating phases of relative steady states and bifurcations, 
which we call chaotic transitions in the thermodynamic conceptualization of world 
history.
23
 
 
GLOPPE had grown without interruption during GS0, the era that extends from the 
completion of geological globalization (around 1500) to the outbreak of the French 
Revolution in 1789.
24
 By the end of the 18
th
 century it had reached the level at which it 
required global scale organization to continue growing.  
 
Chaotic transition led to the establishment of the first, most primitive global order, 
laissez-faire/metal money/zero multilateralism (GS1). It lasted from 1789 until the 
symbolic year of 1834.
25
 From the clash of extreme intentions, such as the creation of an 
egalitarian society through jacobinic despotism, territorial integration through imperial 
conquest, and aristocratic restoration, the triumphant bourgeoisie emerged. The new 
ruling class of entrepreneurial revolutionaries was, in a way, egalitarian; in a way, 
aristocratic, and yet, in another way, successful in integrating the world. By the 1830s it 
was strong and confident enough to push through legislation required for the free 
functioning of markets in commodities, labor, and money. Unobstructed entrepreneurship 
and free competition were on and the factory system could expand. GS1 spread quickly 
to the rest of Europe and to other continents, including the United States, which was born 
with a great penchant for GS1‘s spirit of liberty and entrepreneurial creativity. 
  
The main attribute that distinguished GS1 from GS0 was the recognition that national 
self-interest is best served by making allowances for similar ambitions in the rest of the 
world. GS1 had a pivot or epicenter or ―world leader‖ -- Great Britain. It became the 
reference point against which other nations would measure their institutional 
arrangements, business and personal conduct: The closer to the British model, the better. 
     
                                                 
23
 ―Far from equilibrium‖ means everything that has structure (including tornados and magnets) because 
equilibrium for the physicist is the homogenous dispersion of matter. The late Nobel Laureate Ilya 
Prigogine (1917-2003) is the spiritus rector of a school of physics called disequilibrium thermodynamics 
that focuses on the bifurcation-driven morphogenesis of far-from-equilibrium dissipative structures. For 
more details on applying this natural phenomenon to universal history, see Pogany (2006). 
24
 References to historical levels of population and economic activity are based on Estimating World GDP 
One Million B.C. – Present by Professor Bradford DeLong (UC Berkeley). See: 
 http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/1998_Draft/World_GDP/Estimating_World_GDP.html 
25
 Britain had abolished the Speenhamland system, a comprehensive safety net for the country‘s poor in 
1834, making that year, as Karl Polanyi put it, to be ― . . . the true birthday of the modern working class‖ 
(Polanyi, 1957, p. 101.) 
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In terms of institutions, national economic systems under GS1 were built on the doctrine 
of noninterference by the state in private economic activities (laissez faire) and on the 
mandatory exchange of national paper money for precious metals (mainly gold coins or 
bouillon) at bank windows. GS1 featured strong central state authority without the 
previous era‘s ambition to use it to hoard gold. The system‘s parameters reflected 
institutional harmonization that would overcome the state‘s ―jealous fear‖ (David Hume‘s 
expression) over losing gold. Of course, actuality was very different from the ideal; 
nonetheless, GS1 may, in retrospect, be characterized by its confession.     
 
Although history‘s first global system was born among pain and trauma, it gradually 
ended up raising living standards and led to the creation of the middle class. The 
following are quotes from the system‘s most radical opponents, Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels: 
 
―The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely 
facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. 
The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese 
walls, with which it forces the barbarians‘ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels 
them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. 
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.‖  (Marx K. and Engels F. , 1972)  
 
……………………………………………………………………... 
 
―Subjection of Nature‘s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and 
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for 
cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground — what earlier 
century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?‖ 
(loc. cit.) 
 
In retrospect, these lines, written in 1848, were only the flourish of the trumpet that 
announced GS1‘s future success. Despite financial panics and lasting, comprehensive 
economic dislocations during the 1870s and 1890s, per capita global output more than 
doubled between 1850 and 1900 while world population increased from 1.2 billion to 1.6 
billion. Further acceleration in per capita income was recorded during the Edwardian 
period (the first decade of the 20
th
 century). The world‘s population began to see elegance 
and luxury on levels it had never dreamed of. But the evolutionary clock was ticking 
toward the demise of GS1, which became increasingly unable to accommodate 
GLOPPE‘s further growth. The following were GS1‘s four most obvious limitations: 
 
 Gold-dependence of money supply became a straightjacket to economic growth.  
 Industrialization reached the point at which national economies were prone to 
accelerate and decelerate if left on their own. (The fiscal and monetary measures required 
to deal with this phenomenon through countercyclical government intervention were 
outside GS1‘s parameters).  
 Lack of framework for labor/management bargaining prevented the move to mass 
production and consumption. 
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 Economic and financial interdependence called for concerted action among national 
governments. GS1 had no institutions or schemes for such international cooperation.  
 
GS1 was blown to smithereens by the Guns of August.  
 
The period 1914-1945 was the chaotic transition that ushered in the second and current 
global system: mixed economy/minimum reserve banking/weak multilateralism (GS2). As 
observed in thermodynamic processes, world history (the narrative version of GLOPPE‘s 
expansion) exhibited the signs of diverse and conflicting approaches to reestablishing the 
relative steady state.
26
 These were the alternative macro-blueprints: 
 
 Restoration of GS1 by attempting to bring back the gold standard. 
 Communism: A new form of self-organization.  
 Fascism: Territorial conquest through military aggression; winner takes all (i.e., semi-              
colonial or colonial status for the rest of the world).  
 Mixed economy: A new relationship between public authority and the market, as well 
as between labor and capital.     
 
As befits the physical and mathematical descriptions of chaos, these alternatives clashed 
in an experimental melee – a Darwinian showdown -- from which the mixed economy 
emerged victorious. 
 
The mixed economy became the backbone of GS2‘s domestic economic organization. It 
implies private-ownership-based market economy with important roles assigned to the 
state in securing economic prosperity and social peace.   
 
The United Nations and its charter organizations represent weak multilateralism. Its 
flagship agencies in the economic and financial sphere are The World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The United 
States took the role of epicenter or ―world leader‖ from Great Britain, upgraded with the 
functions of system administrator. Although GS2‘s multilateralism is ―weak‖ in the sense 
that its agencies have no authority over nation states, and multinational companies 
completely elude their jurisdiction, it has been successful. It has created enduring 
mechanisms of international cooperation and has avoided outright ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ 
policies on the level that would endanger global economic continuity.        
 
GS2 outshined and outperformed GS1. It brought material welfare within the reach of 
billions. During the 50 years from 1950 to 2000, despite an increase in world population 
from 2.5 billion to 6.3 billion, per capita global output increased more than four-fold. 
                                                 
26
 Standard social science is far from regarding 1914-1945 in the suggested way. Standing on the height of 
historical and social-evolutionary insensitivity, neoclassical economists of the monetary bent go so far as to 
attribute the Great Depression to mistakes in monetary policy. Bernanke (1983) at least admits that 
institutions can malfunction also as a result of endogenous shocks, in general.         
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During the first decade of the 21
st
 century, this crucial index of average planetary welfare 
has increased by a further 56 percent.
27
  
 
But now the clicking of the evolutionary time machine heralds the onset of a new 
transition. The reason is not, as Marx thought, that capitalism (now in its modern or 
reformed version) could not provide prosperity for the masses, or that it suffered from 
incurable limitations in ensuring economic expansion.
28
 The reason is the exact opposite: 
GS2 cannot stop growing. Its existence is conditioned on the maximum growth 
achievable and, therefore, it is incompatible with a predominantly renewable-resource 
based global society in agreement about the use of scarce exhaustible resources and the 
environment.
29
  
*** 
Such is the structure of global history that best fits the thermodynamic conceptualization 
of the growing human presence on Earth. It could not have been discovered before the 
collapse of the Soviet Block.     
 
While there was a socialist commonwealth, the world lived with the impression that it 
had two parallel, competing global systems. Planet-wide self-organization appeared to be 
bi-systemic. This view was uniform, except that the communists considered their system 
a promise to the world while everybody else regarded it as a menace.   
 
In retrospect, Communism was not and could not have become a global system: 
 
(a) Communist-controlled countries had to deal with the rest of the world in terms of 
GS2's multilateralism; (b) They represented only around five percent of global trade; (c) 
The communist system appealed only to a tiny minority and this circumstance 
disqualified it from becoming the foundation of a new world order, as no global system 
could exist against the will of national majorities; and (d) it did not develop a distinct 
socioeconomic behavior; it only suppressed and deformed GS2-typical behavior. 
(Populations in formerly communist-controlled countries snapped out from socialist 
institutions and immediately adopted multiparty, private entrepreneurship-based 
economic organizations roughly at their respective pre-communist level of social 
development.) 
 
This is not to deny or even belittle the historic significance of Communism. Its early 
economic growth performance and proclaimed idealism presented the rest of the world 
with a major political challenge. It became (1) the ―balance wheel‖ that helped define the 
mixed economy and (2) the socio-psychological, philosophical prop needed to recognize 
that the attributes of the actual hegemonic world order (i.e., those of  GS2) were not 
manifestations of natural laws. 
 
                                                 
27
 Figure derived from CIA‘s World Fact Book. 
28
 Marx predicted the fall of capitalism because he was convinced that ―the bourgeois mode of production 
implies a limitation to the free development of the forces of production.‖ From Marx‘s ―Theorien über den 
Mehrwert‖ as quoted by Lukacs (1999), pp. 11 and 25. 
29
 Diederen (2010) takes authoritative stock of the impending scarcity of global resources. 
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As a balance wheel, the communist threat pushed the balance in the ―mix‖ in favor of 
public expenditures (e.g., military spending in the United States, social programs in 
Western Europe and Japan.) We can acknowledge this by observing that a restriction of 
public authority followed the collapse of communism. The era since 1991 has witnessed a 
forceful wave of deregulations and privatizations, a reradicalization of laissez-faire.    
 
Given that communism was not a global system, we may conclude that, thus far, only the 
phase sequence ―GS0GS1GS2‖ corresponds to the disequilibrium thermodynamic 
process that underlies GLOPPE‘s temporal progression.     
 
*** 
Higher resource costs and environmental threats will stochastically reveal themselves as 
modern human history‘s most powerful mutating factor. The next chaotic transition may 
lead to a third global system, two-level economy/maximum bank reserve money/strong 
multilateralism (GS3). 
 
At one level, production in specific sectors (e.g., mining, manufacture of structural 
materials, certain heavily polluting industries) will have to be controlled and divvied up 
among nations or multinational producers; and some activities, such as space exploration, 
will have to be financed and organized jointly. At the second level, private enterprise and 
free markets would flourish under thoughtfully conceived quantitative constraints.  
 
The monetary subsystem would reflect the need to control both the scale and structure of 
production/consumption. Maximum bank reserve would restrict the ability of banks to 
extend loans. Just as under the prevailing minimum reserve system some banks in some 
instances may keep no reserves at all, under the maximum reserve system some banks in 
some instances might be required to keep 100 percent reserves. While such an 
arrangement may not eliminate financial intermediation, it would certainly change its 
nature: The consent of depositors would be required to make loans.  
 
GS3‘s multilateralism would represent the democratically valid consent of the world‘s 
population to a moral and legal authority to overrule national preferences in favor of 
long-term global interests.  
 
Defending GS3 through contrast with Marxism 
 
Making predictions about the future order of the world is at a serious discount. For 
complete dismissals of the feasibility and usefulness of historical prophesizing, see 
Popper (1961) and Berlin (1954). Mickunas (1998) provides a concise and accessible 
philosophical critique of historical reason-based extrapolations. 
 
The fate of Marxism is an eloquent object lesson.    
 
In his dialectical materialism, Marx saw capitalism (bourgeois socioeconomic order) as 
the thesis that had to face its antithesis, the exploited, impoverished proletariat it had 
engendered. The anticipated synthesis was socialism, leading to communism. What really 
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happened? GS1, the thesis, prompted the Marxism-based revolutionary movement as its 
antithesis.
30
 Military aggressions, at the heart of which was the intention to solve GS1‘s 
nationally experienced problems at the expense of everybody else, was the catalyst that 
brought the world to GS2 -- the synthesis -- at the conclusion of the shambolic era of 
1914-1945.     
 
While there is general agreement that the predictions of Marxism fell to the ground, it has 
been much less widely recognized that its method has also been confuted.  
 
―Totality‖ is the backbone of Marxian methodology.31 And that failed too because when 
it is the center of analysis, voluntarist hopefulness (inspired by aspirations or indignation) 
could easily lead to a vision that a consistent system of rational arguments can endow 
with the adjective ―inevitable.‖ Easily because aggregation to the maximum allows for a 
virtually infinite domain of subsidiary phenomena from which some may be singled out 
as representative of history‘s underlying mechanism, revealing its ―objective rules.‖ 
Moreover, since the period of analysis is large by definition (macrohistory!), the guessing 
of actual future developments becomes next to impossible. 
 
The Marxist experience has enriched historicism by demonstrating that ―totality‖ is 
indispensable in explaining history ex post, but it is as unreliable a concept to predict its 
likely continuation ex ante as any other that nimble theoretical imagination may produce. 
Yet the temptation is understandable. Since the beginning of modernity there has been a 
forceful proclivity to picture the world as a totality in search of ―progress.‖       
 
Where does all this leave GS3? It also seems to correspond to a teleological non plus 
ultra that contradicts the notion of history.  
 
Two reasons are offered for not labeling GS3 just another transcendentally finalist, ―end 
of history‖ utopia. First, it is based on ―real materialism,‖ (physics); and, second, it 
represents the optimal outcome, the achievement of which is by no means a ―historic 
inevitability.‖      
 
―Real materialism‖ is different from the materialism of Marx and Engels. By declaring 
matter to be independent from our senses and minds, constituting a knowable objective 
reality, their basis for interpreting history was nothing more than the dualistic opposite of 
idealism. With minds formed by the 19
th
 century‘s obsessively rationalist continuation of 
the Enlightenment tradition, Marx and Engels firmly believed in the human mastery of 
nature through endless scientific progress. True, they have correctly stated that the 
                                                 
30
 Thus, instead of saying that Marx had falsely predicted the immiseration of the proletariat, it seems more 
appropriate to say that immiseration did not happen because he predicted it. 
31
 Assume, suggested Georg Lukacs two decades before the collapse of the Soviet Block that ―. . . recent 
research had proved once and for all that every one of Marx‘s theses was false. Even if this were proved 
every serious ‗orthodox‘ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern conclusions without 
reservation and hence dismiss every single one of Marx‘s theses -- without being compelled for a single 
minute to renounce his orthodoxy.‖ (Lukacs, 1999, pp. XXV/XXVI). Because, Lukacs argues,  ―.  . . only 
the dialectical conception of totality can enable us to understand reality as a social process.‖ (Lukacs, 
1999, p. 13).     
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driving force of history is independent from individual psychology and motivations, but 
they had remained strictly within the realm of political economy, except for references to 
natural sciences as a reminder of their materialism. They never invoked a single physical 
law that would affect humanity as a biological or physical phenomenon; i.e., when one 
pushes the material creed to its outermost limits, putting aside vitalist and spiritual 
objections.
32
   
 
In contrast to Marxian ―scientific materialism,‖ NHM considers humanity along with its 
extrasomtic extensions (GLOPPE) a physical entity subject to physical laws, including 
the second law of thermodynamics. Consequently, GS3 has not been derived from 
historical reasoning. Rather, it reflects (a) the fact that the excrescence of human 
enterprise has encountered an ecological mutating factor (with the depletion of cheap oil 
as its primary instance); (b) the conviction that price signals and the spontaneous mosaic 
of decentralized decisions will not lead global society to a sustainable relationship with 
the terrestrial sphere.     
 
In brief, GS3 is not posited as a historical inevitability. It is considered an optimal 
outcome given GLOPPE‘s actual level, its élan, and the current state of knowledge and 
technology.   
 
5. New Economic Epistemology Based on GLOPPE and Thermodynamic Reality; 
the Five Essentials   
 
To ground a new epistemology of economic inquiry informed by thermodynamic realism, 
some, at present only vaguely-recognized, latent conditions will have to become precise 
and efficacious. In particular, attributing axiomatic strength to the following five 
comprehensive essentials ought to be considered the fundamentum inconcussum of a new 
integral thinking, hence the critical prolegomena to any sensible future.   
 
Essential No. 1: GLOPPE is an open thermodynamic system; it is autocatalytic and 
adapts to changing conditions.  
 
GLOPPE behaves like an open thermodynamic system because its constituent parts 
perceive themselves as open systems and because ―weak multilateralism‖ does not add up 
to an effective central nervous system that would make humans conscious of an 
inexorable limiting condition to their existence. No system can grow indefinitely in a 
thermodynamically closed environment such as the terrestrial sphere (―closed‖ by virtue 
of its constant material endowment).  
 
GLOPPE feeds on itself. The swelling population increases the economy and the 
increased economy accommodates the natural tendency of multiplication. But even if 
population stopped growing, the desire for higher living standards, the nature of GS2, 
along with its matching incentives for differential individual success, would tend to make 
world output accelerate.  
                                                 
32
 In this regard, they did worse than the novelist Lev Tolstoy who, in his Second Epilogue to War and 
Peace, outlined a brilliant deterministic theory of history based on Newton‘s laws of motion.   
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In the age of global systems, adaptation triggered by internal stimulus has been observed 
through the establishment of GS1 and its transformation into GS2. While GS1 laid the 
foundations for increasing human welfare through the industrial-scale production of 
extrasomatic objects, GS2 has made the broad availability of such objects possible, thus 
enabling GLOPPE‘s drastic postwar growth.   
 
External stimulus that affects the entire world as a mutating factor is only now emerging 
for the first time. Ecological degradation and depletion of nonrenewable resources are 
forcing humanity toward a new pattern of cooperation from local communities to 
international institutions.    
 
Essential No. 2: The second law of thermodynamics guarantees that by increasing the 
share of bound energy within the total energy associated with the fixed supply of matter 
in the terrestrial sphere, GLOPPE irreversibly degrades its existential preconditions.     
 
The growth of GLOPPE augments global fixed assets (GFA). Comprising mainly 
physical capital and infrastructure, GFA has material substrates. It needs replacement 
even under the theoretical assumption that GLOPPE remains constant in size and 
structure. Even then Sisyphus could not rest. He would have to keep the rock from rolling 
down the hill. And the rock that global society must prevent from tumbling down is 
growing in size. Thus, while homo sapiens starring as home faber moves deeper and 
deeper into the wilderness of thermodynamic disequilibrium, conservative economics 
maintains the illusion that natural resources are of diminishing importance (―just look at 
the low percentage of energy and raw materials in developed country GDPs‖ 33) and 
consecrates the false dogma that our civilization tends toward equilibrium even as it 
expands (i.e., its equilibrium is rooted in infinite expansion).     
 
Thus, when viewing the economic process as a throughput of matter from the 
environment back into the environment, as is being emphasized in introductory textbooks 
on ecological and natural resource economics,
34
 it is important to remember that, in 
absolute terms, depreciation is a growing item of the Gross World Product (GWP), 
posing an increasing claim on material and energy resources. Corollary: Sustainability, as 
a broad social goal cannot eternalize human welfare at an arbitrarily high level. Even zero 
population growth combined with zero economic growth (―ZPG/ZEG,‖ widely believed 
to represent an endlessly reproducible steady state) incurs the conversion of free into 
bound energy (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975).   
                      
GLOPPE‘s growth (homo sapiens in its historical and current mode) implies a growing 
circulation of matter in the terrestrial sphere, made up of a somatic and an extrasomatic 
component. Arrivals to the human population absorb matter into their organisms while 
departures return it into the environment. This circulation must be mentally combined 
with the one represented by the decay and replacement of GFA as well as with the one 
entailed by the Net World Product (NWP). 
     
                                                 
33
 For a rebuttal of this prima facie absurdity, see http://www.energybulletin.net/53380. 
34
 Cf. Common and Stagle, 2005; Daly and Farley, 2004; and, Pearce and Turner, 1990. 
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Essential No. 3: GLOPPE is set to approach its limits with exponentially increasing 
force.     
 
The 3-percent annual expansion of the world economy, now considered the minimum 
required rate to maintain living standards for the planet‘s growing population, would 
double the global economy in approximately every 24 years. Thus, both the demographic 
and economic components of GLOPPE are in an accelerating mode.    
 
According to Newton‘s second law, momentum equals mass times velocity. The growing 
mass of GLOPPE (m) multiplied by even a modest positive rate of growth -- the velocity 
(v) -- yields a growing force; i.e., d (m.v) / dt increases over time. Since the maximization 
of economic growth prevails as the universally shared telos, one may say that GLOPPE‘s 
revealed intention is to run into its physical constraints with the maximum force it can 
muster.  
 
Essential No. 4: GLOPPE’s élan faces stochastically manifest constraints. 
 
Nature has begun to apply breaks to the human enterprise. Since this phenomenon is both 
new and unacknowledged, its disclosure will have to entail events and processes that are 
impossible to predict ex ante and may well be considered the products of pure chance ex 
post (although of a limited variance by some coarse categorization of feasible scenarios). 
Thus, instead of ―overshoot and collapse‖ or ―overshoot and oscillate‖ (as elaborated in  
Meadows, Meadows, and Randers,1992), this view suggests a macrohistorically 
significant interlude (a chaotic transition) with patterns becoming discernable only much 
later, along a condensed, macrohistoric timescale. 
          
Global society‘s first ever test of cosmic intelligence is not an easy one. Fuzzy, on again, 
off again dots need to be connected. The incremental comprehension of negative 
experiences (from the seemingly diverse domains of resources, the environment, and 
growth-dependent institutions) will have to lead to a quantum jump in induction. 
Unfortunately, the examiner‘s clock is already ticking and the solution is not yet 
discernible; not in a critical mass.  
 
Essential No 5: GS2 lives on borrowed time; survival under dignified conditions demands 
a new global transformation. 
  
The mixed economy is acceleration-bound, especially in times when population 
increases. At the micro-level, competition generally translates into real capital growth. In 
macro terms, considering the ―marginal propensity to consume‖ to be stable for long 
stretches of time, additional investment must fill the growing gap between aggregate 
income and aggregate consumption (Keynes, 1965, pp. 97, 98, et passim).  Peak oil has 
effectively clogged this accelerate-or-perish system.  
 
The actual and prospective world economic slowdown, along with tensions created by the 
continued accumulation of intra- and international imbalances, is apt to deepen the crisis 
of GS2 institutions. As this phenomenon turns into a widely acknowledged unchangeable 
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fact of history, search for a new global system will intensify. Although the implied 
chaotic transition is likely to lead to GS3, to foresee its duration, actual scenario, and 
intensity would require the faculties of a Cumaean Sybil.    
 
Return of value and utility 
 
The broadening and sharpening recognition of the essential phenomenology of physical 
constraints affecting GLOPPE ought to lead human survival instinct to the deconstruction 
of the extant text as the summary of an expired organon. The obvious difference between 
the old text and the expected new one capable of mediating needs and wants with the 
exigencies of the natural and social environment should reflect the drastic transformation 
of ethical principles underlying economic thought and behavior, thus announcing a new, 
historical phase of value and utility.  
  
6. Toward a New Text     
 
GS1‘s text comprised the core ideas found in Adam Smith‘s ―The Wealth of Nations‖ and 
in David Hume‘s price-specie flow mechanism. These were made irresistibly compelling 
by many prominent writers who elaborated on the merits of laissez faire capitalism as a 
global order via the catholicity of metal money.  
 
The text of the prevalent global system has already been described.  It is worth 
mentioning that the defunct socialist order, which had aspired to become the global 
system after GS1, also had a text. It was ―Dialectical and Historical Materialism,‖ a 
pamphlet that appeared in the Soviet Union in 1938 and was attributed to Joseph Stalin.     
   
Since the current ―accelerate or collapse‖ economic system is incompatible with the 
emergent physical constraints to growth, a new chaotic transition is in the offing. After it 
settles into a new world order, approximating the description of GS3, the corresponding 
text is likely to have the following hypothetical attributes: Recognition of the second 
law‘s significance along with other fundamental principles of energy use; acceptance of 
the species‘ ―thinghood;‖ accrued sense of historicity and self-understanding; emphasis 
on individual consciousness as the integrum of external and internal conditions;  shift to 
an arational assessment of value and utility.   
 
Recognition of the second law and other energy principles. 
 
In agreement with Essential Numbers 1 and 2, the fundamental distinguishing feature of 
GS3‘text will be the acknowledgement that the entropy law plays a crucial role in human 
destiny. 
   
The new perspective will replace general equilibrium, the analytical oriflamme of GS2‘s 
standard economic framework.
35
 Unidirectional (hence irreversible) transformations will 
                                                 
35
 General equilibrium has also been subject to widespread criticism in the nonsocialist literature since the 
1970s. See, for example, Coddington (1975). 
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take their legitimate place along with relative motionlessness, cycling, self-correcting 
fluctuations, and automatic self-equilibration.   
 
The new comprehension of the economic process could not rely on underscoring the 
consequences of the second law alone. It may well draw on other principles of energy use 
in order to create a coherent, formally closed structure of argumentation.      
 
Special emphasis will certainly be made on (a) the maximum power principle, and (b) 
some behavioral aspects of individuals and organizations.  
 
 (a) The maximum power principle, widely applied in the interdisciplinary field of 
ecology, asserts a tradeoff between the rate of converting energy carriers and the 
efficiency of conversion (cf. Hall, 1995). Faster conversion entails diminished efficiency 
and vice versa. Competition among open systems (e.g., nations, business firms, and 
individuals) pushes them to maximize the amount and speed of power intake and 
transformation with relatively little regard to efficiency. The new era would be largely 
characterized by a reversal of emphasis.   
 
(b) Concerning the behavior of individuals and organizations, education, along with other 
forms of conditioning individual and group activities, will reflect humanity‘s inescapable 
thermodynamic reality: In a closed thermodynamic system, the expansion of open 
subsystems (national economies and the growing number of individuals and firms) has a 
hard limit. Instead of glorifying it with the label ―fallacy of composition,‖ GS3‘s text will 
treat its predecessor‘s way of glossing over this simple physical fact with the disdain an 
absurd delusion or logical howler merits.     
 
Giving quarters to our ―thinghood‖ 
 
The recognition that world history is the narrative version of a thermodynamic process 
will lead to the acknowledgement that Thou and I are not only persons with inalienable 
rights (or individuals of a species within the Animal Kingdom or perhaps spiritual 
beings) but also ―things.‖ Consideration of the human biomass as a material entity could 
very well exist as an analytical platform without endangering or competing with religious 
faith or vitalistic secular philosophies. Its usefulness and, on a more general level, the 
expected decline in alienation across society, should more than compensate for the 
implied sapping of anthropocentric narcissism.   
 
Humanity‘s ―thinghood‖ is not alien to intellectual history. For instance, Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) defined ―Dasein‘s being‖ (the focus of his fundamental ontology) 
as ―care.‖ (Heidegger, 2006, p. 329; and, in greater detail, pp. 225-273). ―Care,‖ a variety 
of consciously pursued activities, evokes the image of Dasein as a thermodynamically 
open node that takes in and dispenses energy. Through his object-related concepts of 
―present-at-hand (vorhanden) and ―ready-to-hand‖ (zuhanden), Heidegger reckons with 
Dasein‘s extrasomatic extensions.  
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Historicity and self-understanding.  
 
After the establishment of the third global system, universal history will no longer be 
seen as a mass of events that can be deciphered in an infinite number of ways. More 
concretely, GS3‘s text will contain analytical elaborations on the previous point, viz., that 
the temporal dynamics of planet-wide self-organization has been the morphogenetic 
epiphenomenon of matter‘s self-organization on an expanding scale.  
 
The insights of Hermann Haken (the founder of synergetics) concerning the relationship 
between slowly unfolding stochastic and quickly moving deterministic processes might 
help flesh out this basic conceptualization.
36
  
 
Applying Haken‘s theory in the current context, the establishment and transformation of 
global systems may be considered the stochastic process imposed on the deterministic 
growth of GLOPPE. When GS1 began to stifle GLOPPE, the latter ―rebelled‖ (as it were) 
against the global system‘s order parameters (control variables), causing their bifurcation 
(in the sense of producing multiple solutions).  
 
The new text will certainly underscore the important qualitative difference between the 
transformation of GS1 into GS2 and that of GS2 into GS3. Whereas GS1 became an 
obstacle to humanity‘s quantitative growth while simultaneously improving the quality of 
life of the average individual, GS2 became mired in crisis because its institutions, 
productive relations, typical behavior and expectations had entered into an irreconcilable 
conflict with the planet‘s physical endowments. 
 
GS3‘s text is expected to account for the fact that interconnectedness among nations and 
shared responsibility for general well-being increased and intensified over time. From 
GS1‘s zero multilateralism the world had gone to GS2‘s weak multilateralism, and, as 
long as humanity retains its evolutionary potential and avoids lethal Malthusian traps, it 
will go to strong multilateralism.   
 
The Enlightenment of the 18
th
 century (―a coming to clarity‖ if not on a global scale, at 
least with global consequences) will be seen as the first of a series of Enlightenments 
because ex post ―1914-1945‖ could also to be characterized as ―Enlightenment,‖ and so 
will be the historical learning process that will link GS2 and GS3. Each chaotic transition 
brings ―new truths,‖ conveying the proposition that objectivity is not an absolute, but a 
time-dependent, socially constructed phenomenon.
37
 On that account, GS3‘s text, lined 
up with its predecessors, ought to precipitate the induction that each text is a historically 
                                                 
36
 For a summary of Haken‘s theory, see J. Barkley Rosser Jr. (Rosser, 1991, pp. 212-214). As Rosser 
points out, Haken‘s ―synergetic self-organization‖ conforms to Prigogine‘s notion concerning the evolution 
of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic systems through the ―steady-state--bifurcation--steady state‖ 
sequence. This view is also akin to ―catastrophe theory‖ inasmuch as it perceives the world as essentially 
stable between bifurcations. In contrast, chaos theory implies permanent readiness to discontinuity (Rosser, 
1991, p. 214). 
37
 Philosophical reflection about the manifold ways in which culture and science (especially social science) 
are characteristic expressions of an epoch‘s mentality is a hefty-tome-claiming subject by itself. Kant had 
already criticized ―objectivity,‖ creating a trend that continued through the 19th and 20th centuries. 
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relevant hermeneutic with preeminent paradigmatic authority; inspiring an all-
encompassing hermeneutic about universal history as a continuous process with structural 
coherence.    
 
Hermeneutics, the science of interpreting texts, is a field of considerable importance in 
philosophy and, since the advent of postmodernism also in literary criticism. (For an 
introduction to hermeneutics, see Mickunas, 2007). In the present context, ―text‖ refers to 
socioeconomic phenomenology in its totality (including, of course, institutions). Thus, 
the text is a verbal condensation of what is enduring in form and content in an era‘s 
reality -- the text. And so, ―economics,‖ as a phenomenon of experiential and intellectual 
contemporeneity, may be considered the self-encounter of a specific global system. It is 
not subject to falsification in the Popperian sense.     
 
GS3 text‘s reflections over texts, in general, will surely avoid the obvious error of 
reducing world history to a succession of neatly summarized doctrines and analytical 
descriptions. The history of successions hides humanity‘s horrendous struggle with itself, 
ultimately (already in our times) because of unavoidable natural limits to GLOPPE's 
expansion. To express this thought differently, the temporal sequence of hermeneutics 
stands for the whole‘s hermetically endogenous movement through phases of self-
organization without a universally recognized eschaton.   
 
Looking closer at this process, the meme about the encounter between an immovable 
object and the unstoppable force comes to mind. Despite the huge variety of events and 
vicissitudes in the web of unfolding time, the strivings of particular interests of all 
descriptions; more or less cogent challenges from the moment of its inception, the text 
stands its ground in the battle of ideas. Rooted in culture, education, customs, and 
expectations, its influence extends even beyond the corresponding global system. 
(Witness, for example, attempts to restore the gold standard after World War I.)  Even 
when a global system collapses, the only coherent knowledge and experience regarding 
global self-organization pertains to the defunct system; at least at the beginning of 
systemic interregnum; when the arduous process of demythologizing the expired and 
developing the new hermeneutic begins.
38
 
 
As philosophy, psycholinguistics, and modern literary criticism have amply 
demonstrated, words standing in as symbols for abstract terms are a phenomenal form of 
meanings that had been generated by coinciding and enduring events in the course of 
history. Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer said: ―Understanding must be conceived as a part of 
the event in which meaning occurs.‖ (Gadamer, 2003, p. 164). The global system as an 
extended temporal (macrohistoric) event is organically tied to the concepts its birth had 
engendered, making its comprehension an endless circling in a labyrinth of self-
referential analysis, descriptions, and ideological reasoning.  
 
The text as a hermeneutic is all encompassing. It appears to be robust certainty, absolute, 
ahistorical truth. Its staying power may be explained by (a) rational expectations in the 
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 Olszevwski and Sandroni (2011) showed that it is possible to construct a complex theory that resists 
falsification no matter what data show.  
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aggregate, (b) collective hysteresis, and (c) adaptive pressures from the socioeconomic 
environment.   
 
(a) Totality can relate only to itself. (There cannot be out-of-sample projections of a time 
series when the population is the sample, defined as the universe of socioeconomic 
phenomena.) This condition translates into a sense of stability and ―theoretical calm‖ in 
typical individual consciousness, making only extant economic and social conditions, 
explicitly or implicitly present in the value-infused and value-setting text, appear to be 
rational. All available information and past experience automatically presume the 
continuation of the prevailing system. Rational decisions are defined within the implied 
space and remaining within this space reaffirms the system, allowing the proud 
vindication of rationality to all text-conforming actions, more or less explicit tropisms, 
and moments of foresight. And so, the irony of history reappears from time to time. 
Rationality claims to be ahistoric when, in essence, its temporal unrolling is history.
39
    
 
(b) The text begets fideism and fideism reinforces its creator. The reified system‘s ever 
stronger moorings first dull the perception that reality, which the text mirrored relatively 
well for some time, had shifted. Later, entrenchment will significantly influence the 
perspective on the changed reality. No global system can ever be scrubbed from the 
collective mind, which is another way of saying that history is path dependent.   
 
(c) The socioeconomic environment that coincides with a given hermeneutic demands 
adaptive behavior as a precondition for differential success. Modus ponens is enlarged 
and rewarded (the more indirectly the more useful it is to bolster the text); modus tollens 
is sidetracked as manifestation of nonadaptive (irrational) behavior. Or, as may often be 
observed in the everyday life of academia: ―The tenure-seeking assistant professor rarely 
disagrees with the department chairman.‖ In the end Gleichschaltung prevails, making 
mainstream economists appear as the overlapping generational pupilage of a monopoly 
confessional school. (For the sociobiologist‘s view on adaptation, see Wilson 2000, p. 
577 sic passim.) 
  
*** 
 
The acceptance that world history is a unidirectional thermodynamic process with a 
human face (integral awareness of our ―thinghood‖ and ―personhood‖), that all texts are 
hermeneutic by nature, and that their combined history traces out the birth and 
subsequent strengthening of global society may be characterized as a decisive step 
towards humanity‘s self-understanding.  
 
Strong multilateralism presumes individual consciousness concerning the species 
vocation of survival. Therefore, the establishment of GS3 might be the zero hour for the 
―integral individual‖ who considers the species‘ general interest inseparable from his or 
her wholeheartedly chosen behavior (i.e., one that is nurtured by subsidiarity rather than 
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 Guesnerie (1992) demonstrated how the existing economic system as an intersubjective network of 
mentality reinforces itself and remains robust to noise within the classical Muth model of the rational 
expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961).   
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coerced by corporatism). Such profound change would make the Aristotelian teleia philia 
(―perfect friendship‖) prevail in interpersonal relations across the planet and it 
presupposes an epochal mutation of consciousness, into its arational-integral structure as 
elaborated by Jean Gebser. 
 
 Consciousness  
 
The oeuvre of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938) represents the fulcrum of 
all reasoning and inference that relates the temporal unfolding of consciousness to 
macrohistory because (in a "phenomenological" vein) ―. . . consciousness derives its 
meaning from the world, and the world derives its meaning from consciousness‖ (Stewart 
and Mickunas, 1990, p. 51).   
 
Thus, the proposed integral approach disowns the categorical dualism that separates the 
individual‘s internal life from its socioeconomic setting. (For a poignant critique of the 
dualistic tradition of Western thought, typified by the ―mind-body‖ problem, see 
Mickunas, 2004.) 
40
  
 
The validity of this starting point is confirmed by Gebser who maintained that 
consciousness is ―the ability to survey those interconnections which constitute us‖ and it 
includes ―a function which reacts to the visible course of events in reality (Gebser, 1984, 
pp. 203 and 204).
41
  
 
Specifically, it is argued that the socioeconomic environment, with its ground rules and 
concrete demands toward intentionality-driven individual behavior, characterizes an 
epoch's global system-related consciousness.
42
 Consciousness is the arena in which 
adaptation to the socioeconomic environment is experienced through an essentially 
inseparable relationship between individual and society. Indeed, it is not difficult to see 
the circular relationship between the two. Individual consciousness, as a subject, studies 
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 Several leading intellectuals of the 20th century expressed the inextricable unity between the socio-
economic-cultural environment and individual thinking. To quote just a few examples, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951) said that rather than us speaking the language, language (the collectively 
constructed system of communication) speaks us. (We may say that ―the text speaks the economist.‖) Hans-
Georg Gadamer argued that ―all understanding is self-understanding‖ (Gadamer, 2003, p. 260). Joan 
Robinson: ―It is the business of the economists, not to tell us what to do, but to show why what we are 
doing anyway is in accord with proper principles.‖ (Robinson, 1962, p. 21.) In his 1967 essay of 
foundational significance in postmodern literary criticism, ―Death of the Author,‖ Roland Barthes (1915- 
1980) made a compelling case for considering texts to be tissues woven from uncountable cultural threads. 
His idea that the audience dictates what the author writes may be paraphrased for the current context as 
―the birth of a global-system means the death of the economist.‖          
41
 Gebser goes to great lengths to show that consciousness is more than knowledge, recognition, or 
cognitive faculty. 
42
 Stewart and Mickunas (1990) telescopes phenomenology as a philosophical movement with emphasis on 
Husserl's groundbreaking contribution.  Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere (1998) gives a detailed summary 
of the intense multidisciplinary debate surrounding consciousness with concentration on the second part of 
the 20
th
 century. In recent times, consciousness was "discovered" by authors who question the jejune 
abstractions that mainstream economics deploys concerning human nature (Dopfer, 2005).      
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society as an object and society as the subject ―works‖ on the individual and shapes its 
consciousness as if it were an object.  
 
Historically conditioned consciousness is not a simple phase-revealing, evolutive process, 
but a cumulative one in which dominance of a form of self-understanding will be 
overdetermined by a subsequent one.
43
 The integral-arational consciousness, which, 
according to Gebser, is already attempting to come to awareness, subsumes 
manifestations of all previously dominant structures of consciousness (i.e., archaic, 
magic, mythical, and mental). But it does so in a balanced way that excludes their 
respective deficiencies, allowing all legitimate human inclinations and latent talents to 
flourish. At present, overestimated and overdriven rationality, which Gebser considers 
the deficient mode of the mental consciousness, is the reigning structure. Its money-
metric materialism, its rigidly limited comprehension of the world (perfectly reflected in 
the economic thoughts of GS1 and GS2) has been appropriate under the transitorily 
tenable assumption that we exist in an open thermodynamic system.     
 
It is not beyond the realm of possibilities that GS3‘s text will equate world history with 
humanity‘s struggle for consciousness. Therein lies the importance of Jean Gebser‘s 
insights into the dynamic phenomenology of consciousness, now tending towards its 
integral-arational mutation.     
 
Arational-integral consciousness is presumed to render the current surfeit of militantly 
advocated, narrow causality-seeking disjointed reasons for everything under the sun 
appear to be an obstacle to mutual understanding. It will lead to the recognition that 
monadically sectored rationality, unchecked by a supervening, categorically imperative 
moral will, produces discords with a tendency toward despotism with bellicose sequels.  
 
Arational-integral consciousness may be presumed to be less inclined to rigid 
systematization and more tolerant toward non-arithmomorphic (Georegscu-Roegen) 
arguments in social sciences than presently customary. It ought to enlarge the concept of 
causality.  
 
7. Arational Approach to Value and Utility 
 
Without divinatory clairvoyance, it is impossible to know how a yet-to-emerge 
consciousness structure (with corresponding institutions and typical behavior in the 
socioeconomic sphere) will value goods and how the notion of utility will change. 
Therefore, what follows is admittedly a guess based on the core assumption that 
transformation in economic thinking will match the drastic mutation that the instauration 
of GS3 implies.   
 
Entropy incurred in producing goods and providing services may well be regarded as the 
intrinsic, objective measure of their value, even if it slips through data for the obvious 
reason that the depletion of free energy associated with specific activities cannot be 
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 For Gebser‘s definition of ―overdetermination,‖ see Gebser (1984), p. 38. 
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cardinally metered.
44
 But there can hardly be any doubt that such well-founded principles 
associated with the entropy law as ―a material structure of a given level of entropy can 
serve only once;‖ and ―all activities increase disorder in the terrestrial sphere in excess of 
the order created‖ will have long consequences for aperspectively comprehended value.     
 
Thus, value faces material re-essentialization! 
 
The division of the economic process into two levels by itself would lead to new 
conceptualizations of optimal resource use.  
 
The controlled sector would focus on collective interests and the long run; the free market 
component would focus on consumption and the short run. The first would view the 
environment as a resource (in addition to biological, nonenergy, and energy resources) 
and regard the economic process as an irreversible drawdown of the aggregate sum of 
free (accessible) energy contained in material structures. The second could retain existing 
notions of resource economics with qualifications.  
 
Existing models on valuing nonrenewable resources (e.g., the Hotelling Rule, long-term 
social shadow prices) rooted in GS2 will be abandoned or reformulated as economists 
shed their stone-deaf belief in infinite resource availability, seamless, market-price-
guided substitution, inexhaustible, and just-in-time delivered scientific wonders. The 
image of the terrestrial sphere as an infinite source of fund services will vanish.     
 
GS3‘s text is expected to spell out the difficulty of quantifying entropy-related economic 
problems. But it will probably demonstrate that it is better to be correctly oriented than 
ignoring orientation altogether because of the lack of precise data. Nonetheless, once the 
entropic theory of value crystallizes into a conceptual framework, it will be a respectable 
episteme rather than, as it now appears, a nonscientific derivation that hardly merits 
serious hearing.   
 
Concerning utility, GS3-typical consciousness will recoil from such composite artifacts 
as the economic man, which reduces the individual as a producer to a commodity and as a 
consumer to a zombie with the brain of a pocket calculator.
45
  
 
Thus, utility faces material de-substantialization! 
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 While expressing skepticism about ever being able to quantify entropic degradation associated with 
productive activities, Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p. 283) gave a short summary of past efforts to use low 
entropy as a common denominator of economic value. Since his writing, further efforts have been made in 
this direction. Especially noteworthy is the work of Jing Chen (2005). It introduces a whole new approach 
to the physics of economic value. 
45
 For a critique of the neoclassical convention of treating labor as a commodity, see Bowles and Gintis 
(1975).  In his ―Evolutionary Economics: a theoretical framework,‖ Kurt Dopfer exposes the nonsensical 
rationality that haunts Homo oeconomicus (Dopfer, 2005). Georg Simmel (1858-1918) analyzed the 
difference between satisfaction derived from consumption and aesthetically motivated enjoyment. Cf. 
Simmel (2004, pp. 65-73). 
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The idea of maximizing felicity derived from consumption subject to a budget constraint 
will survive (joy derived from consumption could still be differentiated as being ―greater‖ 
or ―lesser‖) but this quantitative approach will have to share the spotlight with qualitative 
factors. Starting out from the old definition, namely that utility is grounded in pleasure 
(as disutility in pain), the essential tendency of integral consciousness towards seeking 
gratification in intellectual, artistic, and athletic exploits, away from wasteful 
consumption, will assume its rightful place in economic philosophy along with 
constructive entrepreneurial impulses. Integral consciousness will breed what Aristotle 
called eudaemonism – activities tantamount to full individual self-realization.   
 
It is unlikely that guilt connected to understanding that an irreversible catabolization of 
the species‘ ecological ―dowry‖ (Georgescu-Roegen) subtends human presence on the 
planet will reduce the enjoyment of materialistic pleasures. Ideally, trusting the world‘s 
collective wisdom deployed in global society‘s best long-term interest, the limits to 
material consumption ought to allow the carefree enjoyment of what is available.  
 
Finally, if goods produced by local communities do not become commodities (i.e., they 
would be locally consumed), value and utility might see a wide variety of subjective 
differentiation, including completely new predications and the revitalization of earlier 
perceptions that socioeconomic conditions during the intervening era rendered 
meaningless. William Petty‘s famous ―labor is the father . . .  of wealth, as lands are the 
mother‖ would probably gain new pertinence. But what exactly will be the ethical climate 
of a self-sustaining economic canton, where harvest would have supra-individual utility 
but not a price, is not for us to answer. We can say with J.S. Mill: ―There are many truths 
of which the full meaning cannot be realized until personal experience brought it home.‖            
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
A. The proposition that the postwar era is over and business-as-usual economics has 
outlived its relevance is equivalent to the assertion that growth is in a stalling mode. 
Accordingly, the long-term expansion of the global economy projected by multilateral 
agencies, private consultants, and most academic organizations is considered unrealistic.    
 
B. ―Historical inevitability‖ is a discredited notion. Yet when looking at the future, it is 
hard to see an alternative to a chain of events that latter-day macrohistorians are likely to 
periodize as ―cataclysmic rupture,‖ ―long twilight,‖ and ―grand transformation.‖ Given 
that human existence is a far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic process, transition from 
one structure and form of self-organization to the next is a nonlinear process that begins 
with bifurcation and ends with the selection of new systemic control variables 
(parameters). Universal history confirms this general protocol of systemic transition.  
Therefore, technocratic rationality exercised through reforms in the framework of 
conventional politics could not possibly lead from an accelerate-or-collapse economic 
system, in which competition has final authority, to one that draws its raison d’etre from 
the global management of global resources, and from the prospect of improving the 
quality of individual life through ways other than ever-increasing consumption.             
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C. Searching for solutions by the parts will obscure the punctuation of the postwar stasis 
for an indeterminable length of time, handicapping the emergence of the real solution by 
the whole, for the whole. At this writing, the following phenomenological mirror image 
of this state of the world remains unrecognized: (i) decorrelation among basic coarse-
grained macroeconomic policy variables; e.g., between the rate of interest and income, 
between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest; (ii) disturbance in the 
histories of these variables; i.e., the tendency of an increasing order of integration in 
macroeconomic time series; (iii) the lost relevance of the mixed economies‘ IS/LM 
macro-equilibrium model; (iv) the consequent rampage of contradictory assessments and 
recommendations coming from first-rate economic policy advisers and commentators. 
Some say that more deficit spending is needed in order to grow out the debt; others 
advocate the exact opposite on pain of sovereign default. Some swear by more 
quantitative easing to stimulate growth, others firmly believe that such steps have already 
been excessive. Especially pernicious are politicos preaching reverse teleology; that is, 
going back to GS1 through the elimination of the social safety net, collective bargaining; 
and the laughable nonsense of bringing back the gold standard.     
 
D. Only a clear comprehension that humanity has encountered an ecological mutating 
factor in terms of resources, climate, and form of self-organization can make the critical 
re-examination of economic fundamentals emanate signs of life. Cursory references on 
the order of obiter dicta to the finiteness of natural resources will not suffice. The 
proposition that the terrestrial sphere is not and cannot be turned into an imperialized 
periphery of human civilization must be laid bare. 
        
E. The subject ―value and utility‖ represents a promising platform to discourse over the 
future – ―post-thermodynamic enlightenment‖ – economics. The pair‘s long history 
allows hypotheses to be essayed temporally through comparing and contrasting. Since 
each hypothesis has ethical implications, it per force compactly ontologizes associated 
thought systems with logically structured contents, thus catalyzing the search for a 
balance between pre-analytical moral instincts and natural virtues awakened by a new 
sense of reality and a relevant hermeneutic for an ecologically conscious world economy. 
It is always worth remembering that ethics and economics are interwoven historic 
phenomena.    
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